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Abstract
The ever increasing connectivity of current computer environments makes tradi-
tional Intrusion and Detection Systems more and more ineﬃcient. The ability of
moving processes across networks brings new security problems, but also gives us
new ways of dealing with these environments. In this paper, we propose an archi-
tecture for a distributed stealth Intrusion Detection and Response System (IDRS)
based on mobile agents mimicking behaviors of social insects. We present the moti-
vations of an approach that solves several problems actually unchallenged and oﬀers
many new ways of thinking future IDRSs. We also depict the foundations of our
architecture, discuss its main points, and expose partial results obtained from a
prototype. Finally, implementation issues and future work are presented.
1 Introduction
The continuing expansion of network connectivity forces us upon a new way of
thinking the computational process. Traditional schemes are no longer valid
when data housed on an Australian computer can be accessed as transparently
as a local disk from a French machine. We are now witnessing a maturation
process that induces the disappearance of centralized monolithic systems and
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the birth of a complex global distributed environment. One example can
be easily illustrated by the paradigm of mobile agents – mobile programs
that can jump from a computer to another and interact with their hosts.
Because of their high accessibility, huge content and wide distribution, it is
more proﬁtable to send mobile “computing units” roam vast stocks of data
than tap into them and perform treatments locally. It is now often more
interesting to bring the computation to data than the opposite.
Meanwhile, this evolution is not painless. As our systems are becoming
more open, they are also becoming more sensible to malicious attacks. Again,
mobile agents provide us good examples. Who would let an unknown piece
of software enter one’s local area network and interact blindly with one’s re-
sources? Who would trust an agent whose integrity could have been breached?
From an agent’s point of view, the security threats associated with mobile
agents can be divided in two great families: the attacks an agent can perform
toward its environment –other agents or hosting platforms–, and the attacks
that can be performed toward an agent from other agents or hosting ma-
chines. Nevertheless, in this paper we are more interested in the beneﬁts an
agent-based system can bring than in the risks endured by such systems. We
do not approach the problem of mobile code protection. Obviously, mobile
agents exhibit and withstand speciﬁc menaces based on their migratory abil-
ities. But we can likewise use this unique skill to build systems able to cope
with the ever changing distributed environment of a network. Moreover, we
advocate the idea that in the security domain, only a distributed framework is
able to deal eﬃciently with contemporary computer distributed environments.
We present in this paper the skeleton of such a framework based on the con-
cept of mobility. Our work is a proof of concept destined to exhibit several
characteristics:
• the eﬃciency of a distributed detection system;
• the reactivity of a collective response system;
• the toughness and stealth of a framework of which every part is highly
mobile.
All of these points are rooted in the interaction between the populations of
the framework. The notion of complex collective behavior emerging from
the interactions of many simple agents, the emergence, is the basement of
the ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Life ([15]). The study of natural distributed systems
that exhibit capabilities of complex distributed problem solving –like anthills
or wasps’ nests– is a great source of inspiration for real distributed systems
implementation. As our work focuses on the mechanism of total mobility, our
agents should be given the ability to send messages to each other without
knowing the recipient location. We base this communication on the use of one
medium, the electronic version of the chemical medium used by social insects:
pheromone.
This paper is organized as follows. We present in the next section a suc-
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cinct background and previous works in the domain of Intrusion Detection
Systems. Then we describe our approach and report in details the diﬀer-
ent agent populations and their interactions. We also criticize it and discuss
brieﬂy its advantages and drawbacks while reporting the current state of im-
plementation. Finally, we provide an overview of our future plans.
2 Background in Intrusion Detection
Intrusion Detection is deﬁned by [16] as “the problem of identifying individuals
who are using a computer system without authorization”. In our work, we
extend this deﬁnition to the detection of computer processes. These processes
can materialize the interaction of an intruder 3 with a target machine, or can
be autonomous programs. Always in [16], we ﬁnd a large categorization of the
detection model:
• The misuse detection model that monitors the exploitation of known weak
points in an operating system. This guarding can be done by researching a
speciﬁc pattern of actions or events.
• The anomaly detection model that detects changes in patterns of the behav-
ior of the system. We will relate to these detection model in Section 3.2.1.
We will show in Section 3 that an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) based on
mobile reactive agents can perform surveillance in both domains. Moreover,
it is easy to include in such a system a defense layer of mobile agents that
attempt to stop intrusion as it occurs.
Historically, the idea of the ﬁrst IDS dates back to 1980 ([1]), but the ﬁeld was
really born with the model of [8] and the prototypes described in [4] and [20].
These IDSs are centralized and based on a monolithic architecture. Namely,
data are collected on a single machine –by looking at log ﬁles or network
ﬂow– and are analyzed on a single computer. Nevertheless, if this one weak
point is successfully subverted, the attacker obtains considerable power to gain
access to the entire network. We think that this risk of overthrowing is the
main vulnerability of all current IDSs.
The approach depicted in [14] presents a distributed information gathering
step, but the drawbacks are the same: the centralized analyzing process is
hazardous and reconﬁgurability and scalability are limited.
Subsequent works like [24], [22] or [3] present a fully distributed architec-
ture: data collection and information analysis are performed without central
authority. The authors hence answer to the scalability problem. Despite that,
the IDS itself, being static, still endures the risk of being attacked. This is
even more and more conceivable when we consider the increasing of distributed
attacks.
Recently, a pertinent evolution was set in motion with the work of [6], [2], and
[18]. Their architectures –called respectively AAFID and EMERALD– deals
3 Internal or external to the overseen network.
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with the problem of centralized processing. These systems, composed of diﬀer-
ent populations in interaction, are probably the most achieved implementation
of a distributed IDS. Though, and even if the designers of AAFID mention
that “agents could migrate from host to host by combining the AAFID archi-
tecture with some existing mobile-agent architecture”, the mobility aspect is
not developed and no example of use of this ability is given.
In parallel, scientiﬁc investigations were fueled by the study of immune sys-
tems. In [13], the authors state similarities between the defenses of natural
immune systems and computer security: both must discriminate self and non
self to protect a complex system from inimical agents. Our own approach is
based on the use of a chemical-like information that represent an abnormal
behavior. This information could be generated easily by tracing the execution
of sensible processes as described in [13]. We will now present the foundations
of our system. It is based on two main principles: full distributivity and full
mobility. It also sustains a reaction layer embodied in mobile defense agents.
3 Our system
This section will present our approach in detail. We will ﬁrstly describe the
motivations that led its creation, then detail its facets and inner mechanisms.
3.1 What motivated us
Our motivations came from a wide variety of ﬁelds. Let us enumerate them
brieﬂy.
3.1.1 Natural systems inﬂuence
We were ﬁrstly struck by the parallel of functionality between the “real world”
and the “computer world” and then inspired by problem solving methods used
by social insect colonies. Studied in the ﬁeld of swarm intelligence ([5] and
[25]), they are very attractive in the sense that they can cope eﬃciently with
a wide range of problems and can be built with simple basic bricks: swarms
of simple agents that interact with and through their environment. This in-
teraction is mainly based on a marking mechanism and is using as medium
a chemical volatile substance called pheromone. This indirect communica-
tion mechanism, called stigmergy in [11], is the root of the emerging complex
properties of systems made of unintelligent reactive agents. This mechanism
is for example used to trigger and coordinate the defense of an anthill, gather
food, or build complex architectural creations. . .We thought it would be very
interesting to implement a system exhibiting the same properties of distribu-
tion, reactivity and sturdiness, applied to the domain of Local Area Network
(LAN) security. This idea is not new, though. Several existing works are
based on this natural metaphor. They deal with ﬁelds as varied as network
management simulations ([19]), distributed constraint satisfaction problems or
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routing algorithms simulations ([9]). All these domains however share common
characteristics: great complexity, high dynamicity, and physical distribution.
3.1.2 Previous implementation: A.N.T.
The implementation of this IDS is based on an earlier project called Artiﬁcial
Network Termite colony (A.N.T.) ([10]). That framework of mobile agents
solves physically distributed problems and provides network control tools in
using a mechanism of simulated chemical substance deposit for information
sharing and remote inﬂuence. We thus implement an indirect communication
technique that is performed through the environment. Our work showed that
diﬀerent superimposed pheromonal gradient ﬁelds can model many constraints
and oﬀer powerful solutions to problems diﬃcult or impossible to solve with
a centralized approach – like distributed optimization of multiple constraints
scattered across the network.
The principle is the following: we implement on a LAN the evolution in space
and time of multiple criteria in managing dynamic gradient ﬁelds. Each one
represents a criterion to optimize and is emitted by computers where the cor-
responding criterion is optimum. Mobile agents, moving among the machines,
are bathed into these simultaneous pheromone ﬁelds and actively seek opti-
mum solutions –i.e. physical position– that satisfy these criteria. As each host
knows its own and its neighbors’ pheromonal contents, basic agents will be
reactive in the sense that they will only make local migration choices.
A.N.T. is implemented with the following characteristics in mind:
• the reactivity and ﬂexibility necessary to deal with a computer network
dynamic environment;
• the ability to eﬃciently search within a space of states restricted by any
number of constraints (machine load, processes related information, docu-
ment keywords, host description, etc.);
• the use of mobility to satisfy constraints: agents migrate to locations that
optimize criteria they are inﬂuenced by;
• the capacity to dynamically modify the relative importance of the criteria
in the migration decision;
• the light weight of small agents that only slightly increase the network load.
Our mobile agents perceive their world only in terms of concurrent gradient
ﬁelds, so we must build these ﬁelds with care. This is done by implementing
two mechanisms essential to the non-direct communication medium at the
heart of natural colonies: diﬀusion and evaporation. A.N.T. is a distributed
framework that any process can use to create, gather and spread information
in a way suitable to exploit the social insects paradigm in a multi-pheromonal
point of view. It provides an environment for “external” mobile agents (EMA)
and uses mobile internal tool agents (ITA) and static internal management
agents (IMA) for its inner operations.
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A view of the layer-based architecture of A.N.T can bee seen in Fig.1. Each
layer is associated with a distinct population of agents that furnishes services
to the superior layers. Eventually, the higher one provides to users the func-
tionalities of the whole system. There is an exploitation relationship between
the layers: the mechanisms of the middle layer are based on the work of agents
that are hosted in the lower one, while the higher stratum controls and mon-
itors the two others. The lower and middle layers are distributed across the
network, as well as the Communication and Intrusion Detection IMAs.
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Fig. 1. The layered architecture of A.N.T.
3.1.3 Pursuing an ideal: an autonomous stealth IDS
Basic requirements of an IDS, regardless of its inner principles, were describe
by [7]. Among them, we can ﬁnd several points very diﬃcult to achieve with
a centralized system –agent based or not–, because of the constraints they
induce. These points can be handily dealt with a fully distributed framework.
• “The IDS should be adaptive to network topology”.
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It is diﬃcult to keep track of network topology transformations unless a
centralized map is steadily updated. With mobile agents, decisions can
be made ‘in situ’ by the moving actors themselves, increasing the overall
scalability, conﬁgurability and reactiveness of the system. They do not need
to refer to a central authority. They don’t even know that the topology
has changed, they just deal with what they perceive locally during their
migrations. If a central map needs to be built, it can be done easily by
gathering the agents topology knowledge, or by sending speciﬁc mapping
agents through the network.
• “The IDS must be able to operate in a hostile computing environment, ex-
hibit a high degree of fault-tolerance and allow for graceful degradation.”
Because of its critical role, the IDS itself is a primary target. If the central-
ized part of an IDS is brought down by a severe attack –like a Distributed
Denial of Service, for example–, the entire system is paralyzed. Bring down
a distributed population of defender would require to attack successfully
every part of this population. This is harder to do, but not impossible for
a well organized attacker. Meanwhile, if every member of this population
is mobile, how to attack it? How to damage a process that don’t stay more
than handful of seconds on the same host? So the moving parts of the
IDS acquire a stealth aptitude that prevent them to be harmed. If every
part of the IDS is endowed with such a potential, increasing the overall un-
predictability, the entire system sees its vulnerability greatly reduced. We
advocate that this aptitude, exhibited by most of the natural distributed
systems, can help to strengthen future IDSs and gift them with essential
advantages via attack-resistant architectures. In the worst case, if an agent
is destroyed 4 , the damages are tiny: this agent wont lay its pheromonal trail
to inﬂuence its peers. As these ﬁelds are build by the entire population (see
Section 3.2) the pheromonal information lost is inﬁnitesimal in comparison
with the whole trail. We can compare this to the strength of an anthill: you
can destroy many ants, but the overall eﬃciency of the nest is unaﬀected.
Finally, a regulation mechanism can ensure the stability of the population.
• “The IDS should be capable of providing an automated response to suspi-
cious activity”.
The task of most traditional IDSs is to detect intrusion, but once their job
is done they let human decision take the ﬂoor. Implementing an automated
action of response is certainly not an easy duty. Meanwhile, some of them
([6]) implement some response mechanisms (we henceforth call them IDRS).
For a traditional IDRS, such a response involves notifying the central deci-
sion core, wait its arbitration, and apply its decisions. With a distributed
point of view, an agent can perform a local reaction instantaneously without
referring to anyone. If the detected problem goes beyond its competence,
it can still call other agents for help. This example illustrates the great
4 For example it is trapped on a machine that is shut down.
47
Fenet
importance of diﬀerentiation in the agents population. It is the base of
the modularity at the scale of the multi-agent system. Some small sub-
populations, whose size can be dynamically adjusted to the needs of the
moment, can be specialized to handle speciﬁc attacks. Our future projects
(see Section 4) include the use of genetic programming to evolve counterat-
tack agents. By using this mechanism, the IDRS will be able to adapt and
tune itself without the need of human hand and in response to the state of
the network.
• “The IDS should be able to perform data fusion and be able to process
information from multiple sources”.
A multi-population approach is well suited to deal with heterogeneous dis-
tributed environment. Through the process of specialization, the IDS can
send dedicated agents to ﬁrewalls, routers or switches. They can gather
information, but in the case of an IDRS they can also update the rules of
these devices to take into account the recent events detected. Moreover, as
the communication between the updater and the device is local and doesn’t
transit necessarily through the network, it is more secure than a distant
update. It also reduces the possibility of being subject to insertion and
evasion attacks.
• “The IDS should be able to work with other Commercial Oﬀ-the-Shelf se-
curity tools”.
This case is close to the preceding point. An agent can be dedicated to
“talk” to a commercial tool using its speciﬁc protocol, allowing an easy in-
terfacing between the two systems. We can even envisage a mobile agent
belonging to a population common to several distributed mobile IDSs.
We can see that the beneﬁts of a distributed mobile IDRS are numerous. Let
us now present the architecture on which we built the foundations of such a
system. We will then discuss its implementation characteristics and reposition
ourself regarding the theoretical model.
3.2 Architecture of the system
This section present the architecture of our IDRS, a system mimicking the
functioning of natural distributed systems made-up of simple reactive agents.
Its purpose is to achieve the eﬃciency found in natural systems by using
emergence and mobility.
The principle is the following: the detection of an intrusion will trigger the
release through the network of an alert pheromone in a gradient pattern.
Mobile response agents –the lymphocytes–, sensitive to this chemical message,
will converge to its source point to initiate a defensive action. More details
are presented in Section 3.2.2.
We will now detail the inner components, then illustrate their role with an
example.
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3.2.1 The components
The pheromone servers
These servers are the cornerstones of our distributed framework. They
are sedentary agents that provide an interface between the host itself and
the mobile agents. The latters communicate with these servers via meeting
connection after having been authentiﬁed as unfaked agents. During this
connection, the mobile agent accesses the pheromonal information of the server
–only relative to the server’s hosts and to its neighbors– and is also able to
add its own deposit.
The server is aware of any information regarding its host (sub-net, what
processes are running, who is connected, etc.) so it can make the equivalent
pheromonal information available to each agent. For example, it automatically
computes its load and codes it in a chemical form that is spread by the internal
management agents via the internal tool agents (ITA).
The main functionalities of each pheromone server are embodied in a team
of internal management agents (IMA). They are started up by each pheromone
server at its beginning time and are in charge of the administration of internal
pheromone tables. Their roles are the following:
• Diﬀusion management.
The diﬀusion IMA manages how a pheromone diﬀuses, when the diﬀusion
must be initialized, and how –i.e. at which distance– to perform it. The
diﬀusion itself is ensured by a swarm of mobile internal tool agents launched
by the IMA.
The diffusion IMA of a pheromone server also notices diffusion waves launched
by other servers and updates its internal tables.
• Evaporation management.
This IMA is in charge of the gradual weakening of the chemical information
stored by its server. This eﬀect allows the system to “forget” bad or old
solutions and to avoid uncontrolled convergence.
• Access control.
The communications between the pheromone servers and their interlocutors
–regardless of their origin– are monitored by these agents. Their role is to
ﬁlter the access to the pheromonal information, as well as to log every
dialogic act. They employ ITAs to authenticate interlocutors on the hosts
they are pretending to come from.
Independently, other IMAs interact with the pheromone server. They re-
side in the upper layer –see Fig.1–. This layer ensures the interface between
the pheromonal services and “external” applications that use its mechanisms.
“Intrusion Detection and Response IMAs”, also called watchers, dwell here.
The watcher
Its role is to provide intrusion detection services. This can be done by
several ways, providing either host-based or network-based identiﬁcation, as
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well as misuse or anomaly detection:
• Monitoring the behavior of sensitive processes by studying their system
calls. The approach reported in [13] is a very interesting mechanism, as it
can generate a “percentage of abnormality” that can be easily transformed
in pheromone. The statistical models, in function of their size, can be
stored locally on each host or in mobile agents ready to answer to a calling
pheromone when it is needed by one of the watchers.
• Integrating data of mobile checking agents. Watchers can correlate data
gathered by dedicated mobile checking agents, or lymphocyte agents in
random checking mode (see Section 3.2.1). This method could implement a
multi-point detection to deal with distributed attacks coming from machines
within the LAN, with attacks directed toward the entire network, with
worms, or with network scans.
• Monitoring network connections at low level by scanning TCP packets.
• Looking for the exploitation of known weak points by checking on local
intrusion signatures –trojan ﬁles or root kits, for example–, ﬁles integrity,
or user behavior proﬁles.
• Interacting with traditional ID mechanisms. Through an interface agent,
the watcher can use the results of the several of-the-shelf IDSs –like SNORT
[21]– and convert their outcome in a pheromonal information.
• Gathering evidence of the attacker’s activity during the time laps between
the detection of the attack and the response of the lymphocyte agents.
Depending on the severity and the type of the alert, the watcher will generate
the description of a pheromone. It can include the type of the attack, its
gravity –coded in the intensity of the ﬁeld–, a diﬀusion rate, a distance of
diﬀusion, an evaporation rate, a degree of conﬁdence, the name of the endan-
gered machine, or whatever information an administrator judges important
to incorporate. One important point is that the watcher should watch itself,
as well as the pheromone server hosted on the same computer. Once the
pheromone is ready to be spread, the watcher won’t contact the pheromone
server directly. It will create an antibody agent.
Antibody agents
The function of these short-lived agents is to interact with the pheromone
server to initiate the spread of a pheromone.
We have chosen to embody this functionality in such a mobile agent for se-
curity reasons: if the pheromone server is itself the target of the attack, the
antibody will migrate to a neighboring machine to use its server. It will also
tag the pheromone to indicate that no lymphocyte should trust the phero-
monal information of its original server anymore. Once the pheromone server
agrees to take in hand the diﬀusion, the antibody self destructs.
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Lymphocytes agents
These agents are the population that retort to the attacking processes.
Their behavior is divided in two modes:
• The random checking mode.
When in this mode, the agents are waiting to scent an alert pheromone but
are perceiving nothing. Instead of being idle, they roam the LAN randomly
to perform ﬁle integrity veriﬁcation –using TRIPWIRE [23] for example–,
or whichever regular checking an administrator could desire. This wander-
ing behavior also increases the probability to perceive an alert pheromone.
When it happens –the pheromonal information of every host is checked–,
they toggle into the defense mode.
• The defense mode.
When a lymphocyte ﬁnds itself bathed in a pheromone gradient, it migrates
towards the source of this chemical. Not all the lymphocyte agents, however,
are obliged to answer to all the chemical call of help. They can be specialized
and respond only to the attacks they are trained to deal with. They can
jump directly to the source machine, or follow an indirect path and climb the
gradient towards the source machine. The latter solution allows to remove
the name of the source from the pheromonal message. It could be a security
constraint. One important point must also be mentioned: every lymphocyte
has a small probability to ignore a chemical call, even if it is suited to provide
an answer. This behavior inserts a small quantity of noise in the system.
It allows the agent to increase their probability to catch a posterior call,
paradoxically increasing the response of the system and its resistance to
“decoy attacks”. Once the lymphocyte has reached its destination, it can
start to react to the intrusion.
Taking defensive action is the main role of the lymphocyte agents. This re-
sponse can take the form of traditional mechanisms like the interruption of
the TCP connection or the update of ﬁrewall rules. But mobile defenders can
also implement response schemes beyond the abilities of actual IDSs. The
mobility of the lymphocyte allows them to initiate a defensive reaction on any
component of the network, in a distributed way. The IDRS can then track
the attacker’s path through the network –by using MAC addresses or by in-
terrogating routers–, dynamically modify the whole network environment to
resist to the incoming aggression, monitor all network traﬃc to and from the
attacker, isolate the target or the attacking machine, or even launch a coun-
terattack directed towards the attacker’s host or network.
The lymphocyte agents can also interact directly with the pheromone servers
to emit chemical messages. This feature is important for several reasons.
Within the future genetic mixing layer (see Section 4), agents will have to be
able to call for mates in order to generate oﬀsprings. Likewise, if a lymphocyte
sees that the seriousness of an attack was underestimated by a watcher –i.e.
that the intensity of the pheromone was too low–, it can boost it with a new
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diﬀusion. It can also call for help or notify an administrator if a situation goes
beyond its control.
There are several diﬀerences between the use of a pheromonal signal and
a basic message broadcast.
(i) The chemical diﬀusion is controlled. When a watcher build a pheromonal
signal, two characteristics are carefully chosen: diﬀusion and evaporation.
They inﬂuence the shape of the gradient, the maximum distance at which
the pheromone will be perceived, and the time curve that describes the
disappearance process. Diﬀerent values will be chosen according to the
role of the message: call for immediate help, or just raise suspicion con-
cerning a user in the entire network.
(ii) A broadcast is not relayed by routing devices. As the diﬀusion process
is managed by a swarm of mobile programs, the routers or switches are
not a barrier anymore. Moreover, diﬀusion can be done according to the
description of a virtual network architecture independent of the physical
connectivity.
(iii) Pheromone ﬁelds are additive. When a pheromonal alert is diﬀused by
two neighboring machines under the same attack, the two ﬁelds merge and
reinforce each other, increasing the probability to attract a lymphocyte
agent. These agents will tend to converge on the most severely stricken
computer, but will also initiate a response on its neighbor.
(iv) Using a pheromone gradient allows to broadcast a message activating
a migration behavior without explicitly mention the destination. Only
mobile agents able to climb the gradient are able to reach its source.
Hence an eﬀect of information masking that is intrinsic to the concepts
of distribution and mobility. This feature is valuable in an environment
where sniﬃng tools can be used by potential intruders.
(v) Pheromone can be altered during the very process of diﬀusion. Diﬀerent
information can be inserted in the chemical message in function of the
physical environment in which the wave is spreading.
Having described its diﬀerent parts, we will now illustrate the functioning of
our IDRS.
3.2.2 How does it work?
It is easier to illustrate the main features of our approach by using an example.
The following ﬁgures explain the basic sequencing of a reaction to an attack.
Fig.2 represent the IDRS in a guarding state. The watcher is overseeing
a process, as well as its network connections. It also monitors itself and the
local pheromone server. A lymphocyte agent in random checking mode is
performing integrity control on the binary code of the overseen server.
In Fig.3, an intruder is trying to gain unauthorized access. It can do it
either from a local process or via a network connection. The watcher detects
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the intrusion and generates the pheromone that will be passed to the new-
born antibody agent. The latter will then contact the pheromone server, be
authentiﬁed, initiate the diﬀusion of the chemical message, and die. While this
time, the watcher is collecting evidences of the intrusion and is trying to trace
the attacker to its source machine. This can be done by using a dedicated
population of mobile agents that yet has to be built.
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Fig. 3. An attack is detected.
Fig.3 illustrates the response to the attack. The lymphocyte agents have
perceived the pheromone ﬁeld deployed by the pheromone server and have
converged on the threatened machine. One of them is locally trying to regain
control of the attacked process (Cf. Section 3.2.1). We can also see an example
of attacker traced back to its hosting machine. Once the mobile lymphocyte
agent moved here, any impeding or retaliating action can be undertaken.
We have described the principles, structure, agents and behaviors our IDRS
is based on. However, some components of our system are not implemented
yet. A ﬁrst prototype is currently tested. We will present it in the next
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section.
3.3 Actual implementation
The ﬁrst prototype we are testing is intended as a proof of concept for the
architecture, the pheromonal communication medium and the use of full mo-
bility. It is implementing the main mechanisms and interactions, as well as
several security-dedicated behaviors. Still, the ID characteristics of the watch-
ers are simulated, and the pheromonal sensitivity of the lymphocyte agents
are hard-coded and not dynamically conﬁgurable yet.
This prototype is developed in Tcl/Tk [17] and uses the framework D’Agents
[12] to provide the mobility mechanisms. It allowed us to gain valuable knowl-
edge:
• The main idea of building a fully distributed mobile IDRS is not a chimera.
By using a communication medium that permits eﬀective non-direct com-
munication through environment marking, mobile parts of the framework
can exchange messages eﬃciently and independently of their physical loca-
tion.
• The dynamic adaptation of a system based on mobile entities is very ef-
ﬁcient. Our tests have shown near real-time responses and quick self-
reorganization as the network topology is modiﬁed or computers are restarted.
We still do not manage automatic restarting of the servers yet.
• Mobile agents provide a great ability to operate in heterogeneous envi-
ronments and to be specialized. The interaction between the antibod-
ies/lymphocytes populations and the pheromone servers was easily set up
once the communication protocol was established. Likewise for direct ac-
cess to local hosts informations. The parameters are currently set at the
population level, but nothing prevent to adjust independently the behavior
of a single specialized agent.
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• The resistance of the mobile agents via stealth ability is impressive. We
must however yet tune the system between two tendencies: highly mobile
resistant agents consuming bandwidth, an less nomadic agents with a re-
duced network load.
• The size of the mobile agents’ code is currently very small, so the bandwidth
consumption is mainly produced by the frequence of migrations. This point
will loose importance as the average bandwidth of LANs is getting higher.
Nevertheless, a commercial application will contain a larger amount of code,
and the mobile ability of the watchers, for example, could be re-examined.
The eﬀect of this prototype was to increase our motivation and the hope we
placed in a mobile distributed model. However, we identiﬁed some drawbacks.
• The attack-eluding ability based on the mobility can be so eﬃcient that
it is annoying. Very mobile processes are diﬃcult to control in a central-
ized way 5 , and an attack-resistant architecture can also reveals itself as a
command-resistant architecture. The consequences of this point are that
we must entirely rely on the use of pheromone to control the mobile pro-
cesses. When we want to kill an agent or replace it by another version,
we must attract it on a trap machine before. We use a special pheromone
that takes precedence over all other scents. This can be a security ﬂaw. If
this pheromone is artiﬁcially emitted by an attacker, the entire system can
collapse. One way of dealing with this problem is to encrypt and authentify
every dialogic act between pheromone servers, watchers and lymphocyte
agents.
• Mobile code is heavily exposed to tampering. We were able to sniﬀ the
migration of an agent on an Ethernet connection. This point may be beyond
the scope of this paper, we are however convinced that encryption is the
main solution.
• Increasing the complexity of agents’ behavior and grouping them in diﬀer-
ent population also increase the complication of coding new agents. The
greater the number of diﬀerent potential interlocutors, the more complex
the behavior.
This ﬁrst prototype is subject to many improvements. We will now brieﬂy
describe them.
4 Future work
Our projects can be divided in three main axis:
(i) ID and Response behaviors.
The Intrusion Detection aptitudes of the watchers are currently simu-
lated. Our ﬁrst project is to plug our work to the model of [13]. The
5 For example for a network security administrator.
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information of most IDSs are symbolic and give birth to relatively big phe-
romonal descriptions. The measures of anomalous behaviors is based on
the calculus of a numerical distance, much more suited for a pheromonal
coding. This project will also let us test our architecture in real ID con-
ditions for the ﬁrst time.
Actual lymphocyte agents are specialized in reacting to speciﬁc attacks.
One important enterprise will be to build a genetic framework to explore
the potentialities oﬀered by more “ALife-oriented” approaches. We hope
to exhibit self-specialization faculties and attain self-regulation eﬀects
observed in natural systems.
(ii) Interface and interoperability.
We intend to develop interface agents able to exchange information be-
tween our system and current oﬀ-the-shelf products.
One big problem we had to face up is the centralizing of information
relative to the state of the distributed moving brick of the system. This
problem has been dealt with by introducing appropriate information-
sending code into agents and by using a central tracker which role is to
provide an image of the network to a central observer and to conﬁgure
and initialize the system in a running state. We must now develop a neat
GUI to pilot this tool.
(iii) System considerations.
All the processes involved in our framework actually run as high level
interpreted code. We plan to study which parts could be inserted in
kernel space.
5 Conclusion
We present an architecture for Intrusion Detection and Response Systems
based on mobile agents. It is inspired from natural distributed systems and
uses environment marking techniques for non-direct communication between
mobile processes. The architecture is based on the interaction of several pop-
ulations of agents that are described and whose roles are explained.
We relate the inner functioning of our system and picture it with an example
including intrusion detection and response behavior. We also demonstrate the
feasibility of this model by the implementation of a working prototype. The
diﬀerences between the actual implementation and the theoretical model are
also stated.
Finally, the characteristics of our distributed mobile architecture are depicted,
as well as its advantages and drawbacks in comparison with traditional ap-
proaches.
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